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I. INTRODUCTION
Volunteers provide an important component to many public and
private organizations.' Between September 2012 and September 2013,
62.6 million people volunteered at least once and spent a median of fifty
hours volunteering. 2 Despite these numbers, the Equal Employment
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, American University Washington College of Law; B.A.,
Political Science, 2010, St. Mary's College of Maryland. I would like to thank Professor Ugelow
for his direction and encouragement in the development of this Article. I am also indebted to the
staff of the University of FloridaJournalof Law and Public Policy for their editorial wisdom.
Finally, I owe tremendous gratitude to my family-Charles, Sandra, and Zachary Murphy-for
their enduring patience and support.
1. See Maureen Minehan, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished:Five Questions to Ask Before
Using Volunteers, 29 No. 15 EMP. ALERT 2, July 26, 2012 (calling volunteers "integral" parts of
religious, public, and humanitarian organizations).
2.

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES - 2013 (Feb. 25,

2014), availableat http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/volun.pdf. The numbers are likely higher
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and federal courts have failed to
protect volunteers from employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3
Title VII requires individuals first to exhaust administrative remedies
with the EEOC before filing suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The EEOC and federal courts will dismiss volunteer Title VII claims if
volunteers do not receive "significant" benefits from their employer.' On
appeal, federal circuit courts are split as to what benefits qualify as
"significant" and whether receiving benefits should be either the singular
factor or one of many factors to determine whether volunteers are
employees for purposes of Title VII. 6
Consider the following example: Jack and Jill begin volunteering for
the same non-profit organization and perform the same tasks. Jack is
unpaid, but Jill receives minimum wage. Their employer discriminates
against both of them. The result? Jack cannot recover against his
employer under Title VII because he is an unpaid volunteer.
Alternatively, because Jill is paid by her employer, she is likely
considered an employee for purposes of Title VII.7 Thus, she is entitled
to the same Title VII remedies as other employees, including
compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees, court costs,
and declaratory relief.8
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently broke
with the majority of jurisdictions in order to protect unpaid volunteers. 9
In its decision, the court noted the similarities between a traditional
workplace environment and the workplace experiences of a volunteer: 10
A workplace is not necessarily any different for a noncompensated volunteer than it is for a compensated "employee,"
and while both are generally free to quit if they don't like the
conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither should
because the BLS defines volunteers as those whose work is unpaid, except for expenses.
3.

See infra Part II.

4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2014). See infra note 176 (explaining that the Americans with
Disability Act (ADA), 29 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2000), incorporates the rights and remedies of Title
VII, and therefore also requires exhaustion with the EEOC).
5. See McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2007).
6. See infra Partll.A.
7. See Tara Kpere-Daibo, Note, Unpaid and Unprotected: Protecting Our Nation's
Volunteers through Title VII, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 135, 138 (2009).
8. James J. LaRocca, Note, Lowery v. Klemm: A FailedAttempt at Providing Unpaid
Interns and Volunteers with Adequate Employment Protections, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 131, 143

(2006).
9. Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 4, 2012).
10. Id.
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have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other unlawful
discrimination and harassment."
Employers are aware of this reality, and an article in the Employment
Alert newsletter outlined five questions for employers to ask themselves
before even considering hiring volunteers.1 2 In particular, the article
indicates that volunteers ought to be "properly classified and managed to
avoid potential legal liability" because "[m]ore than one employer has
been shocked to find a court considered their volunteers to be employees
entitled to wages, benefits, and other employment-related protections."' 3
Part II of this Article will address the standards used to evaluate
whether a volunteer is a protected employee under Title VII. It will
further introduce the circuit split over whether volunteers ought to first
demonstrate that they receive "significant remuneration," or benefits,
from their employer prior to further proceeding in federal court. Part III
will present the importance of exhaustion requirements with respect to
the EEOC and its coverage of volunteers under Title VII. Part IV will
discuss interpretive rulemaking through Section 553(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Part V will recommend using
interpretive rulemaking to amend the EEOC's Compliance Manual,
which is used as either the exclusive or a primary rationale for excluding
volunteers under Title VII, in order to cover volunteers more effectively
and resolve the circuit split. Part V argues that the majority of courts and
the EEOC itself have forgotten the spirit of Title VII, which was to
provide broad protections for workers.1 4 Courts have instead excluded an
entire class of individuals from protection simply because they serve an
organization that does not and may not ever provide them with benefits
that would constitute "significant remuneration." 1 5 This Article
concludes by indicating that the Supreme Court's analysis in Clackamas
GastroenterologyAssociates P. C. v. Wells denotes that even the EEOC
Compliance Manual's laundry list of characteristics to determine whether
an individual is employed may fall short in protecting workers.
II. TITLE VII
Congress intended for Title VIll 6 to provide the customary remedy

11. Id.
12. Minehan, supra note 1.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1982).
15. Volling, 2012 WL 6021553, at *8-9, *13 n.7.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2014).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAWAND PUBLIC POLICY

174

[Vol. 26

against employment discrimination. 1 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court wrote
in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson'8 that "[t]hrough Title VII[,]
Congress sought in the broadest terms to prohibit and remedy
discrimination."' 9 The statute defines an "employer" as "a person . . . who
has fifteen or more employees . .. and any agent of such a person." 20 This
language is complicated by Title VII's circular 2 ' definition of an
"employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." 22 The Supreme
Court has confronted the ambiguous meaning of this definition in three
major decisions: first in Communityfor Creative Non- Violence v. Reid;2 3
next in NationwideMutual Insurance Co. v. Darden;24 and most recently
in its 2003 decision in Clackamas GastroenterologyAssociates, P.C. v.
Wells. 25
In Communityfor CreativeNon- Violence v. Reid,26 the Court held that
Congress's circular language was intended to describe the employeeemployer context in a "conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency" principles. 2 7 Specifically, the Court
17.

Id.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.

Id. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act also incorporated the remedies under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2014); see supra text accompanying note
14. But see Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2014) (offering a remedy
for volunteers who are qualified individuals with a disability, whose workplace "receiv[es]
Federal financial assistance," and whose workplace discriminates against them by reason of their
disability).
18. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
19. Id. at 80.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2014).
21. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003) (stating
that this is a "mere nominal definition" and "completely circular") (internal citations omitted);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (stating that the definition is
"circular and explains nothing").

22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2014). The following statutes define "employees" in the same
manner: Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2014);
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2014); Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2014); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2014); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2014).
23. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731 (1989).
24. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-28.
25. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444, 452.
26. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740, 751-52.
27.

Id. at 740; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§

220(2) (1958) (providing list of
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outlined the following factors that courts should consider when analyzing
the employer-employee relationship:
The employer has the right to control when, where, and how the
worker performs the job; [t]he worker is paid by the hour, week,
or month rather than the agreed cost of performing a particularjob;
[t]he employer provides the worker with benefits such as
insurance, leave, or workers' compensation; [t]he worker is
considered an employee of the employer for tax purposes (i.e., the
employer withholds federal, state, and Social Security taxes); [t]he
worker and the employer believe that they are creating an
employer-employee relationship. 2 8
Three years later, the Court in Darden revisited and accepted the Reid
Court's "right to control" analysis as the controlling test to use when
federal employment law left the employer-employee relationship
unclear. 29 In 2000, the EEOC published its Compliance Manual3 o and
used the Reid and Darden agency "right to control" test as part of its list
of factors to demonstrate whether "a worker is in an employment
relationship with an employer." 3 1
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Clackamas again examined an
employer-employee relationship. 32 There, the Court was persuaded by
the EEOC Compliance Manual's holistic approach.3 3 Reiterating its
earlier position from NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, the
Clackamas Court held that "all of the incidents of the [employeremployee] relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor
being decisive" when determining if a particular worker is an employee,
and therefore protected by federal employment discrimination laws. 34
A. Volunteers Under Title VII
The EEOC Compliance Manual indicates that "volunteers usually are
not protected 'employees"' under Title VII. 3 5 Instead, the EEOC limits

criteria for identifying master-servant relationship).
28. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
29. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24 (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,
258 (1968)).
30.
31.

EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, (2009); 2006 WL 4673363.
EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 30, § 2-III(A)(1) (current through 2009);

2009 WL 2966755, at *1.
32. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442.
33. Id.at448-51.
34. Id. at 451 (citing NLRB, 390 U.S. at 258, in the context of an independent contractor).
35.

EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 30,

§ (A)(1)(c).
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Title VII coverage to volunteers who fall into one of two exceptions. 36
Under the first exception, the volunteer position must regularly lead to
compensable employment with the same employer. 37 This Article will
focus entirely on the second exception. Under the second exception, the
employer must (1) maintain sufficient control over the volunteer's
work; 3 8 and (2) provide volunteers with some benefits constituting
"significant remuneration," rather than benefits incidental to the
"otherwise gratuitous relationship." 39
Prior to commencing a civil action in federal court, volunteer
claimants must first exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC.4 0
But, because unpaid volunteers typically do not receive sufficient benefits
from their employer to qualify as "significant remuneration," 41 and, do
not regularly obtain employment from the entity, 4 2 the EEOC regularly
dismisses volunteer actions for failure to state a claim.4 3 Accordingly,
issuing an interpretive rule through Section 553(b) interpretive
rulemaking governing the EEOC Compliance Manual in order to reflect
the reality of volunteer positions would improve coverage to volunteers
and provide clarity to employers and employees over whether they are
covered by Title VII.
Even after exhausting administrative remedies with the EEOC, most
federal circuits likewise require a volunteer first to demonstrate that he or
36. Id
37. Id. (citing Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994)
(indicating that individuals are not covered under Title VII until their employer has "the ability to
directly affect a plaintiff's employment opportunities")).
38. This prong of the second exception is predicated primarily upon the agency principles
articulated in Reid, Darden, and Clackamas.
39. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 30,

§

(A)(1)(c) (citing Haavistola v. Cmty.

Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 1993).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (e), (f) (2014). This also subscribes to the general rule that
claimants must exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing in federal court. McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds.

41. See infra note 43, at *1.
42. Complainant v. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120133242 (E.E.O.C.), 2014 WL
586747, at *1-2 (Feb. 6, 2014) (treating interns and volunteers the same under Title VII). Fiftythree percent of college graduates for the class of 2012 were not paid for any internship they had
in college. Dylan Matthews, Are Unpaid Internships Illegal?, WASH. Rachel Burger, Why Your

Unpaid Internship Makes You Less Employable, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/01/16/why-your-unpaid-internship-makes-you-less-e
mployable/.
43. See Shinseki, 2014 WL 586747, at *1-2 (treating intern "in essence" the same as a
volunteer under Title VII and similarly first inquiring whether the intern received remuneration);
Complainant v. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120132601 (E.E.O.C.), 2014 WL 199171, at *1
(Jan. 8, 2014) (holding that a volunteer who did not receive any "significant remuneration" had
no standing to participate in the EEOC complaint process); Traylor v. Conner, EEOC DOC
0120063833 (E.E.O.C.), 2008 WL 1968721, at *1-2 (Apr. 25, 2008) (volunteer); 29 C.F.R. §
1614.107(a)(1) (2015).
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she received "significant remuneration," or benefits, from her employer
before he or she can proceed with his or her Title VII claim.4 Only after
a volunteer first demonstrates that she receives remuneration will these
courts further inquire into the employer-employee relationship under the
common law agency test articulated above. 45 In particular, the Eighth
Circuit found it "unnecessary" to proceed to the second step if an
individual does not receive compensation. 46 Likewise, the Second Circuit
agreed and held that compensation was an "essential condition" of the
employer-employee relationship.4 7 However, as discussed below in part
II: B, the Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois departed from the threshold analysis, holding instead like
Clackamas that no one factor was dispositive. 4 8
To add to the confusion, courts have not specified how much
compensation constitutes "significant" or what kind of benefits constitute
"remuneration" in order to be an employee under Title VII.4 9 For
example, in United States v. City ofNew York,5 o the Second Circuit held
that "remuneration" did not need to be a wage or salary, but could instead
include transportation and childcare expenses, cash payments equal to
minimum wage, pension, food stamps, eligibility for workers'
com ensation, etc.5 By contrast, in Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire
Co., 2 the District Court of the District of Delaware held that
reimbursement for some work related expenses, line of duty benefits,
44. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting Waisgerber v. City of Los Angeles, 406 F. App'x 150 (9th Cir. 2010) (repudiating
Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008), which originally embraced a multifactor test to establish whether a volunteer was an employee); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch.
of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 1998); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d
1236, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 1998); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997);
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc. 6 F.3d 211, 221-22 (4th Cir. 1993); Graves v.
Women's Prof'1 Rodeo Assoc., 907 F.2d 71, 73-74 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Morgan, infra note
63, at 1224; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW

§

1.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008)

("Unless otherwise provided by law, an individual is a volunteer and not an employee if the
individual renders uncoerced [sic] services without being offered a material inducement.").
45. Juino, 717 F.3d at 434-36.
46. See Graves, 907 F.2d at 74.
47. See O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 116.
48.
49.

See infra Part II.B.
See generally LaRocca, supra note 8.

50. 359 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004); Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir.
1999) (indicating benefits may be provided by a third party, so long as they are provided to
volunteers as a result of their position); EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 30,

§

(A)(1)(c).

51. City ofNew York, 359 F.3d at 92 (holding that only after a volunteer first demonstrates
she receives significant remuneration from her employer will Second Circuit courts further
examine whether she is a covered employee under Title VII, and therefore under the ADA);
Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221-22 (holding "significant remuneration" includes potential certification
as an EMT and reimbursement for medical insurance).

52.

No. Civ.A.03-842-KAJ, 2005 WL 83784 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005).
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discounts with Verizon, and pension system were insufficient to qualify
as a financial benefit or promise.5 3 In addition, federal volunteers
receiving a living allowance may not be considered employees if the
organization for which they volunteer has fewer than 15 traditional
employees because a living allowance was not a "wage." 54 Not
surprisingly, under such a strict and uncertain regime, courts are reluctant
to consider "indispensable work experience," "networking opportunities,
or "giving back to the community" significant enough to cover unpaid
volunteers or interns under Title VII.55

B. The Split
Citing Clackamas,56 the Sixth Circuit57 and Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois58 repudiated the majority rule, instead
applying a multi-factor test to the volunteer employment context.5 9
In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer FireDep't, Inc.,60 the Sixth Circuit
applied Clackamas' multi-factor test to volunteer employment
discrimination claims, holding likewise that no single factor should be
dispositive in determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists.61 Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that remuneration should not be
"an independent antecedent inquiry," upon which a court ends its analysis
that a volunteer is not an employee. 62 Consequently, the court launched
the first split with the majority rule. 63 Following the split, one
commentator advocated for a broader repudiation of the majority rule and
an adoption of the Reid and Clackamas test.64
In 2012, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in

53. Id. at *7; Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 715 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (free flight
training, death benefits, and airplane use discounts were not "significant" benefits).
54. Self v. I Have a Dream Found.-Colo., No. 13-1090, 2013 WL 6698079, *2-3, (10th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2013) (AmericCorps volunteers).
55. LaRocca, supra note 8, at 133-34; Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern
Employment Realities: The Casefor the UnpaidIntern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2640 (May

1998); York v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002).
56. 538 U.S. 440, 450-57 (2003).
57. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011).
58. Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 2012 WL 6021553, *8 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
59. 538 U.S. 440 (2003). See Bryson, 656 F.3d at 545-55; Volling, No. 11 C 04920, 2012
WL 6021553, at *3.
60. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 353-54.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 353.
63. Christopher R. Morgan, Note & Comment, Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire
Department and the Changing Understandingof Volunteer as Employee, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L.

REv. 1223, 1235 (2013).
64. See id at 1238-39.
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Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad65 similarly applied a multi-factor
employment test to the volunteer context. 6 6 This court sits in the Seventh
Circuit, which has not yet weighed in on the question of whether
volunteers are covered employees under Title VII. 6 7 Nevertheless, citing
Bryson,6 8 Darden,6 9 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood,7 0 the district court held that inquiry into an
employment relationship should not end if one does not receive
remuneraion.the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sidley Austin, Bryson, and
Darden, the district court held that inquiry into an employment
relationship should not end if one does not receive remuneration.7 1
Instead, the district court held that it should examine a myriad of factors
under the common law agency test, and not set a single "bright line" when
determining if a volunteer is an employee. 7 2
The Volling court also found that inquiring into whether a worker
received remuneration was less relevant in the context of volunteers. 73 in
particular, the court noted that volunteers can comprise a significant
percentage of a non-profit organization and individuals are generally not
motivated to volunteer due to pecuniary rewards, but instead by a desire
to perform public service or other spiritual or altruistic motives. 74 in
support, the court cited the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which
indicated "[m]any agents act or promise to act gratuitously." 7 5 As a result,
the definition used by courts and the Restatement encompasses the broad
range of volunteers who do not receive any or only receive insufficient

65. 2012 WL 6021553 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
66. Id. at *8-9 (citing and applying EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696,
705-08 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying an earlier multi-factor employment test from Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to a law firm partnership context to the context of
volunteers).

67. Id. at *8. The Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood rejected the
"tyranny of labels" that the Supreme Court, EEOC, and employers have used by distinguishing
between traditional employees and independent contractors in order to escape liability under Title
VII. 315 F.3d at 705. In particular, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's approach in
Darden to look to a number of factors when considering whether an individual is an employee

under Title VII. See id. at 705-08.
68. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2011).
69. Darden, 503 U.S. at 318.
70. Sidley Austin, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
71. See Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. I IC 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, at *8-10
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012).
72. Id. at *7-10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *9.
75.

Id. at *8 (citing RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF AGENCY

§

1.01, cmt. d (2006)). Further, the

Restatement (Third) of Agency defines "gratuitous agent" as an individual who "acts without a
right to compensation." § 1.04(3) (2006).
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remuneration for their position. 76 Moreover, the court noted that the
degree of control of employees a supervisor may have in the volunteer
context might also be strikingly similar to a traditional employeremployee relationship.7 7
The Volling court conceded that remuneration is indeed an important
factor.78 Nevertheless, the court noted that because Title VII neither refers
to volunteers nor to the receipt or payment of remuneration, the Supreme
Court mandated that courts use common law agency principles when
assessing an employer-employee relationship.79 As such, the court held
that it made little sense and there was no textual basis to conclude that
Title VII did not extend to an entire class of workers simply because one
factor, namely remuneration, distinguished them from traditional
employees. 8 0

In 2013, the most recent circuit to examine whether volunteers are
protected under Title VII explicitly rejected Bryson, holding instead with
the majority of federal circuits.8 1 In Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire
DistrictNumber 5, the Fifth Circuit considered both the majority rule and
Bryson's reasoning, but held that the latter's analysis was
"[un]persuasive" because unpaid volunteers are never "hired" in the
traditional sense of receiving remuneration. 82 In its decision, the court
cited the EEOC's Compliance Manual as an element of its rational,
demonstrating the importance this document plays in determining
whether volunteers are protected under Title VII. 83 Finally, the court
articulated that it was not for the courts to expand the protection of Title
VII to volunteers. 84 Rather, like O'Connor v. Davis before it, the court
signaled that it was in the "province of Congress" to afford them a
remedy.8 5

III. EXHAUSTION

The Supreme Court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies
promotes two functions: protection of agency authority and judicial
efficiency. 86 In particular, the Court noted that agencies, not courts, have
§

76.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Volling, 2012 WL 6021553, at *8.
Id. at *10.
Id
Id at *9.
Juino, at 438-39.
Id at 439.
Id
Id at 439-40.
Id at 439 (citing O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 119.
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144-46.

1.04(3) (2006).
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the principal responsibility for programs that Congress delegated to them
to administer. 8 Exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures that
agencies have the opportunity to correct mistakes within their regulations
and provide a forum for dispute resolution between parties so that further
judicial action can be avoided. 8
Title VII claimants must first exhaust administrative remedies with
the EEOC before filing in federal court.8 9 Further, individuals must file a
charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days
after the discriminatory act. 90 In particular, the charge must be specific,
give the agency reasonable opportunity to act upon it, and put the
defendant on notice. 9 1 Moreover, if individuals do not first file a charge
with the EEOC, the claim will be dismissed outright. 92
Exhaustion of administrative remedies with the EEOC in particular is
important because it gives the agency an opportunity to investigate
whether it would like to sue on the plaintiffs behalf.93 Once a claimant
files with the EEOC, the EEOC must investigate the claim.9 4 The EEOC
may choose to represent the claimant and file a claim against the
discriminating entity. 95 Finally, if the individual proceeds in federal court,
the claims brought against the employer must be within the scope of the
original EEOC claim. 9 6
Like the majority of federal circuits, when a volunteer exhausts
administrative remedies with the EEOC and the volunteer does not
receive "significant remuneration" from her employer, the EEOC will not
further inquire into the employer-employee relationship.9 7 Unlike the
87. Id. at 145.
88. Id. at 145; Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. at, 193-95 (1969).
89. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. at 144-45.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2013). The 180-day filing period is extended to 300 days ifa
local or state agency enforces a statute that prohibits employment discrimination on a similar
basis. EEOC, Time Limits for Filing a Charge, www.eeoc.gov/ employees/timeliness.cfm (last

visited Aug. 17, 2014).
91. See Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
92. See Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2010); McInerney v. Rensselaer
Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2007); Hamilton v. Rhee, 770 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244
(D.D.C. 201 1);but see McBride Cotton & Cattle Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.
2002) ("[F]ailure to exhaust does not deprive a federal court ofjurisdiction when the exhaustion
statute is merely a codification of the exhaustion requirement."). JOB DiscIuMINATION (2015).

93. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, if a plaintiff
seeks judicial review of the EEOC's action, the APA requires her first to exhaust administrative
remedies. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2014).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2013).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(f(1) (2014).
96. Conner v. Ill. Dep't ofNat'l Res., 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005).
97. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120132601, 2014 WL 199171 *1 (Jan. 8, 2014)
(holding that a volunteer who did not receive any "significant remuneration" had no standing to
participate in the EEOC complaint process); see also Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. DOC.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

182

[Vol. 26

federal circuits, however, the EEOC looks no further than its Compliance
Manual for the rationale for its decision. 98
IV. INTERPRETIVE RULEMAKING

As demonstrated in Part II, the EEOC and federal courts are split as
to what benefits qualify as "significant" and whether receiving benefits
should be either the singular factor or a collection of factors to determine
whether volunteers are employed for purposes of Title VII. 99 This Article
proposes that the EEOC issue an interpretive rule through the 5 U.S.C. §
553(b) rulemaking procedures to clarify this confusion. Specifically, the
EEOC should interpret its Compliance Manual to indicate that
remuneration is one of many factors to consider when determining if a
volunteer is an employee. Whether a volunteer receives remuneration is
neither dispositive nor a threshold issue after which other factors should
be addressed.
A. Rulemaking 101
Under the APA, an agency must provide general notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register and accept and consider comments
from interested parties, with two exceptions. 00 First, the APA exempts
agencies from the general notice and comment requirement when the
agency finds for good cause that "notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 01 The first
exception will not be the subject of this Article. Under the second
exception, the APA exempts "interpretive" rules, as compared to
substantive rules, from the notice and comment procedure.' 02 Interpretive
rules clarify existing rules to assist in adjudication and to clarify the
meaning to the public;1 03 alternatively, substantive rules are those that
0120133242, 2014 WL 586747 *1-2 (Feb. 6, 2014) (treating intern "in essence" the same as a
volunteer under Title VII and similarly first inquiring whether the intern received remuneration).
98. Shinseki, EEOC Decision No. 0120132601, 2014 WL 199171 *1 (Jan. 8, 2014)
(holding that "benefits such as a pension, group life insurance, workers' compensation, and access
to professional certification, even if the benefits are provided by a third party," are sufficient to
constitute "significant remuneration" (quoting Rose, EEOC Decision No. 0120101487, 2010 WL
3137321 *1 (July 27, 2010))).
99.

100.
101.

See supra Part II.B.

Id. § 553.
Id. (noting that when an agency finds for good cause, it must "incorporat[e] the finding

and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued").

102. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
103. See Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 457 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Interpretive rules constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for

guidance. Interpretive rules are not intended to alter legal rights, but to state the agency's view of
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implement rules 04 or "create new law, rights, or duties, in what amounts
to a legislative act." 0 The Supreme Court bars an agency "under the
guise of interpreting a regulation

. . .

[from] creat[ing] de facto a new

regulation."106
Like promulgating regulations, interpretations of existing regulations
must be reasonable in order to receive full deference under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.'o7 Under
Chevron, courts will utilize a two-step process for examining agency
interpretation. 0 8 First, the court will examine whether the intent of
Congress is clear, and if so, the court will end the judicial inquiry and is
to impose Congress' expressed and unambiguous intent.' 0 9 But, if
Congres§ has either not spoken directly on the precise issue or the
statute's meaning is ambiguous, the court is to accept an agency's
"permissible" construction of the statute.110 Moreover, the Supreme
Court will not accept agency interpretations if they are "plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.""'
B. The Cases
In Clackamas,"2 the Supreme Court examined the extent to which it
would give Chevron deference to the EEOC for its Compliance Manual.
Citing its decision in Christensenv. HarrisCounty," 3 the Court held that
the Compliance Manual would not receive Chevron-level deference." 4
Although the document constituted a "body of experience and informed
judgment""' to which the court could look for guidance, it lacked the
what existing law requires."); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985).
104. Elizabeth Williams, What Constitutes "InterpretativeRule" ofAgency so as to Exempt
such Action from Notice Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A. §

553(b)(3)(a)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1995) (more broadly defining "interpretive" rules as those
which "clarify, interpret, or explain existing law, state an administrative officer's understanding
of a statutory or regulatory term, and/or remind affected parties of their responsibilities under
existing law, or some similar language").
105. Clarry v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting White v. Shalala,
7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1993)).
106. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
107. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008).
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 843.
111. Bowles v. Seminole Rock& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
112. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
113. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
114. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449 n.9 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000)).
115. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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force of law.116
More recently in FederalExpress Corp. v. Holowecki," 7 the Supreme
Court examined EEOC interpretive rulemaking in the agency's
Compliance Manual and internal memoranda for the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)." 8 At issue was what constituted
filing a formal "charge alleging unlawful [age] discrimination."" 9 This
language appeared in the statute and in the EEOC regulation, but federal
circuits adopted different definitions for what was required. 2 0
Consequently, employees met difficulties when they sought relief
because filing requirements varied by jurisdiction.' 2 ' Like in Clackamas,
the Supreme Court in Federal Express did not afford the EEOC full
Chevron deference, but instead gave it a "measure of respect" under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.1 22 Using the Skidmore standard, the Federal
Express Court examined a number of factors to determine the degree of
deference the Court ought to afford the EEOC.1 2 3 These factors include
the consistency to which the agency applied its interpretation and the
agency's relative expertise in the subject matter.1 24 There, the
Compliance Manual and internal memoranda had been binding for five
years, noting a level of consistent application.1 25 Consequently, the Court
accepted the EEOC's interpretation of the statute, noting that the
interpretation was consistent with the "design and purpose of ADEA"
because the statute allowed for a "permissive[ly]" wide scope of
charges.1 2 6
Further, the Court held that the EEOC complaint procedures ought to
be accessible to laypersons with "no detailed knowledge" of the EEOC's
processes or statutory functions.1 2 7 Though a narrower rule could offer
the EEOC more consistent filings from employees, the Court deferred to
the EEOC due to the agency's expertise regarding ADEA claims. In
addition to deference, the Court understood that statutory gaps and

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449 n.9.
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008).
Id. at 392
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399-402.
Id. at 399, 403 (noting that when courts examine the "fairull measure" of agency

deference, they look to the "degree of the agency's care . .. consistency . .. formality ...

relative

expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency's position" (citing United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001))).
125. Id. at 399.
126. Id. at 402.
127. Id. at 403.
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V. THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Like the employees in FederalExpress,129 volunteers have met similar
difficulties seeking relief under Title VII, given the varied jurisdictional
interpretations of what constitutes "significant remuneration" and
whether remuneration should be the threshold requirement or one of
many factors.1 30 "At the center of the courts difficulties is the phrase
'significant remuneration,' which neither appears in Title VIll 3 1nor the
EEOC regulations." question is the phrase "significant remuneration,"
which neither appears in Title VII nor the EEOC regulations. 3 2 Instead,
this phrase appears only in the EEOC Compliance Manual,' which
courts utilize in vastly different ways.' 34
Unlike the Supreme Court, which announced on three occasions that
a multi-factor test ought to decide an employer-employee relationship,1 35
the EEOC and a majority of federal circuits departed from these
holdings.' 36 As a result, volunteers are either barred from pursuing a
claim entirely or may not receive the same Title VII remedies afforded to
traditional employees, including compensatory damages, punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, court costs, and declaratory relief.1 37
This Article proposes to interpret the EEOC Compliance Manual to
reflect more accurately the Supreme Court's multifaceted approach set
forth in Reid 38 and later affirmed in Clackamas.139 This Article
demonstrated above that the EEOC Compliance Manual already sets up
this proposition, but the EEOC itself and most federal circuits are
ignoring the letter and spirit of the Manual and Title VII.1 40 Part II showed
that the EEOC Compliance Manual indicates volunteers are protected
128. Id. (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005)).
129. Fed. Express, 552 U.S. at 389.
130.

See supra Part II.

131. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2008) (Title VII definitions).
132. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2014).
133. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (citing Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of
Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 1993)).
134. Id.
135. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450-51 (2003);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992); Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. LaRocca, supra note 8, at 143.
138. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
139. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450-51.
140.

See supra Part 11.
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under Title VII if they demonstrate both that they are under sufficient
control of their employer and receive significant remuneration.141 While
a majority of federal courts and the EEOC will not examine a volunteer's
claim unless the volunteer first demonstrates that he or she receives
remuneration,142 neither the Compliance Manual nor Title VII indicates
that remuneration or the "right to control" should take precedence over
the other when determining if a volunteer is protected.1 43 Indeed,
remuneration appears nowhere in Title VII.144 Instead, the employer's
"control" over an employee found in the EEOC Compliance Manual' 45 is
the same common-law "right to control" agency test first formulated in
Reid.1 4 6 As a result, the Supreme Court held that this language requires a
more holistic understanding of the employer-employee relationship in
which "with no one factor being decisive."147 Consequently, it should
have been self-evident to both the EEOC and federal courts that there
shall be no "threshold" factors and that no factor shall be more important
than any other.
Thus, this Article argues that the EEOC ought to issue an interpretive
rule through Section 553(b) rulemaking specifically clarifying that its
Compliance Manual utilizes no "threshold" factor when determining
whether a volunteer is considered an employee for the purposes of Title
VII. Instead, the EEOC should articulate, like the Supreme Court has held
since Reid, that the determination of whether volunteers are employees
should be made through considering a myriad of characteristics of the
employment relationship. The controlling analysis should be the common
law "right to control" test, which prevents a single factor from being
uniquely dispositive over other qualities of a volunteer's position. Sample
language of the interpretive rule should emphasize the Clackamascourt's
holding that "no one factor is dispositive"l 48 and the Compliance
Manual's language that a determination of an employer-employee
relationship "requires consideration of all aspects of the worker's

§ 2-III(A)(1).

141.

EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA)

142.

See supra 44Part II.A ("Even after exhausting administrative remedies with the EEOC,

most federal circuits likewise require a volunteer first to demonstrate that he or she received
'significant remuneration,' or benefits, from her employer before he or she can proceed with his
or her Title VIl claim.").
143. See Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 1 IC 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, *7, *9-10
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012).
144.

145.
146.
147.
NLRB v.

Id. at *7.

EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-III(A)(1).
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740, 750-51 (1989).
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451 (2003) (citing
United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968), in the context of an independent

contractor).

148.

Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 451 (citing NLRB, 390 U.S. at 258).
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and federal
relationship with the employer." 49 Because the EEOC0
courts"' look to the Compliance Manual for guidance in their decision to
cover volunteers, this clarification should reduce or eliminate the degree
to which courts should look to remuneration as the singular factor in their
analysis.
Though several law review comments and articles have made similar
recommendations, none have addressed tackling this issue at its source,
the EEOC Compliance Manual.1 52 In particular, they have broadly
endorsed certain aspects of case law, particularly the Bryson decision, but
without providing a more tangible approach to confront the challenges
volunteers face under Title VII.'s3
A. FirstSteps
Like promulgating agency rules under Chevron,1 54 agency interpretive
rulemaking will receive deference if (1) Congressional intent is not clear
and (2) agency rules are a "permissible" interpretation under the
statute. 5 1

Under the first prong, the Supreme Court and lower courts have held
that the employer-employee language in Title VII is "circular and
explains nothing,"' 5 ' therefore meeting the first prong of the Chevron
test. Because both Title VII and the EEOC's regulation are silent on the
matter and the purpose of Title VII is to prohibit employment
discrimination, 157 increasing the scope of Title VII to protect volunteers
more truthfully reflects the Supreme Court's holdings of broader
protections to beyond the traditional employer-employee relationship. 5 8
Under the second prong, the Supreme Court announced that the EEOC
Compliance Manual in the context of an employer-employee relationship
should not receive full Chevron deference, but rather the lower Skidmore
deference afforded to regulations that constitute a "body of experience
§ 2-III(A)(1) (emphasis added).

149.

EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA)

150.

See supra text accompanying note 97.

151. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013).
152. See LaRocca, supra note 8, at 141-44 (looking to the courts and legislature for
guidance). See also Morgan, supra note 63, at 1245-46 (similarly requesting future courts and
Congresses adopt its recommendations).

153. Morgan, supra note 63, at 1237-46.
154. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
155. Id. at 842-434; Fort Hood Barbers Ass'n v. Herman, 137 F.3d 302, 307-08 (1998).
156. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003) (stating
that this language is a "mere nominal definition" and "completely circular"); Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (stating that the definition is "circular and explains
nothing"); Lerohl v. Friends of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003) ("In both Title
.

VII and the ADA, Congress adopted a circular definition of 'employee'. .

157.
158.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2008).
See supra notes 28-34.
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and informed judgment."'` 9 Under that standard, the Court would accept
an alteration of its position so long as the interpretive rule is not "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 6 0 Here, both an
employer's "right to control" over a volunteer and the employee's
remuneration are listed in the EEOC Compliance Manual.161 Because this
recommendation does not seek to change the elements the EEOC
indicates that constitute an employer-employee relationship, but rather
seeks to interpret the Compliance so that "no one factor is dispositive,"
like the holding in the Supreme Court's decision in Clackamas regarding
the EEOC Compliance Manual in the context of independent
contractors, 16 2 the interpretation is neither "plainly erroneous [n]or
inconsistent with the regulation."163
B. Substantive or Interpretive
This Article does not recommend a substantive rule because it does
not create new rights or obligations or have the effect of legislation.1 6 4
The existing Compliance Manual does not indicate how to weigh the
factors in the volunteer context.1 6 5 The right to control is one of the
factors of the test, which encompasses a variety of factors like those under
Reid. 16 6 Indeed, remuneration should be a factor considered by the court
because it goes to the degree of a relationship. Like the court held in
Volling, the entirety of an employer-employee relationship should not
hinge on whether one receives remuneration.1 6 7 It does a disservice to the
statute, which has the purpose of broadly providing a remedy against
employment discrimination.1 6 8
In Clackamas, the Court articulated that the six factors listed in the
EEOC's Compliance Manual to determine whether a shareholder-

159. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
160. Clackamas Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
161. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-III(A)(1).
162. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 451 (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,
258 (1968), in the context of an independent contractor).
163. Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414.
164. See generally Clarry v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996).
165. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 2-H1I(A)(1)(c).
166. Id. § 2-III(A)(1) (listing the following as factors: "[t]he employer has the right to
control when, where, and how the worker performs the job[;] . . . [t]he work is performed on the
employer's premises[;]; . . . [t]here is a continuing relationship between the worker and the
employer[;]; . . . [t]he employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job[;] . . . [t]he
employer can discharge the worker.").

167. Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. I IC 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 4, 2012).
168. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 80 (1982) ("Through Title VII[,] Congress
sought in the broadest terms to prohibit and remedy discrimination.").
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director is protected under Title VII are not exhaustive.' 6 9 The Court cited
70
its earlier decisiono
in Darden, in which it indicated that the answer to
whether one is in an employer-employee relationship cannot be decided
by a "shorthand formula or magic phrase."' 7 ' Since the EEOC's
Compliance Manual should not receive as much deference as courts are
affording it,172 courts are welcome to look beyond the enumerated factors
in it. 17 3 As such, this offers courts the opportunity to look beyond the two
factors listed in the Compliance Manual towards a more holistic
understanding of the relationship. As a result, it more accurately reflects
the Supreme Court's holdings beginning in Reid to require a more
comprehensive knowledge of the employer-employee relationship in
question.

74

This change has a number of benefits. First, it provides coverage for
an entire class of individuals who have been left unprotected against
workplace discrimination. Because a number of statutes, including the
ADA, ADEA, and the FLSA, use the same language to describe the
75
employer-employee relationship,s
and some of those statutes
incorporate the rights and remedies under Title VII,1 7 6 this has a broad
effect on protecting volunteers in a variety of employment contexts.
Second, it puts employers on notice that volunteers can bring claims
against them for violating Title VII. Third, because remuneration will no
longer be the controlling factor, it eliminates confusion and discrepancy
between jurisdictions over what qualifies as remuneration and whether
remuneration should be one of many factors to consider. Finally, it
preserves an intent of administrative exhaustion: namely, to halt litigation
in federal courts, which are already overburdened; to permit the EEOC to
conduct an investigation to verify whether the claims are indeed
actionable; and to preserve a substantive record to judge the merits of an
employment discrimination claim, not whether the claimant meets some
uncertain threshold question from an EEOC Compliance Manual.

169. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 n.10 (2003).
Indeed, the Compliance Manual itself indicates that "[t]his list is not exhaustive." EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) § 2-III(A)(1).
170. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450.
171. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324
(1992).
172. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449 n.9.
173. See id. at 450 n.10.
174. See generallyid 440; Darden, 503 U.S. 318; Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
175. See supra note 22.
176. Title I of the ADA incorporated the remedies of Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2013).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Though volunteers regularly play a substantial role in the operation of
an organization, they often are not seeking pecuniary rewards for their
service, and therefore do not receive benefits that would constitute
"significant remuneration" from their employer. Consequently,
volunteers are left unprotected under Title VII and other federal
employment discrimination statutes that utilize similar language to define
an employer-employee relationship.
The EEOC Compliance Manual provides the means by which
volunteers are left unprotected, and also the methods by which the spirit
of Title VII can be restored. In the EEOC Compliance Manual, the EEOC
writes that volunteers are generally not considered employees unless (1)
their volunteer position regularly turns into compensable employment or
(2) their employer exercises a sufficient degree of control over their work
and the employer provides them with some form of benefits that
constitute "significant remuneration," a phrase that has neither a clear
meaning nor a consistent application.
The majority of federal circuits and the EEOC held that volunteers
must first demonstrate that they receive significant remuneration before
the courts will examine any other factors of their employer-employee
relationship. Consequently, because most volunteers do not receive these
benefits, courts regularly dismiss their cases, and they are without any
remedy from otherwise legitimate employment discrimination claims.
Only two jurisdictions have broken away from the majority of circuits,
holding instead like the Supreme Court that no single factor in an
employment relationship is uniquely dispositive. Indeed, the Volling
court noted that because the statute never mentions remuneration and the
EEOC Compliance Manual never indicates that remuneration should play
any larger role than other characteristics of an employment relationship,
it was irrational to believe that Congress intended to shield an entire class
of workers from Title VII protection simply because they do not receive
a paycheck or other forms of remuneration.
Suitably, the EEOC Compliance Manual can also serve as the source
of remedy for volunteers' claims. This Article argued and demonstrated
that clarifying the EEOC's Compliance Manual could restore Title VII as
a broad measure to protect individuals against workplace discrimination.
Through Section 553(b) interpretive rulemaking, the EEOC could declare
the volunteers will be covered if they can demonstrate an employeremployee relationship exists under a myriad of factors using the Reid
"right to control" test, which still includes remuneration.
This interpretive rule proposed by this Article meets the requirements
of Chevron and Skidmore because Congressional intent of the definition
of an "employee" is ambiguous and the interpretive rule is neither clearly
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erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation. The Supreme Court has
consistently argued that the definition of an employer-employee
relationship should not be refined to a "shorthand formula or magic
phrase." Accordingly, phrases like "significant remuneration" should not
control whether an otherwise legitimate employment discrimination
claim succeeds or fails. Further, the Court has articulated that the EEOC
Compliance Manual itself is not exhaustive, which even extends the
inquiry beyond the factors enumerated in the Manual. As a result, though
this Article only seeks to provide a more inclusive understanding of what
constitutes an employer-employee relationship in the context of
volunteers, there may be an argument that courts should even look
beyond the EEOC Compliance Manual for guidance. Nevertheless, this
Article provides the necessary first step in returning the spirit of Title VII
back to the EEOC Compliance Manual.
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